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Abstract
This paper develops a DSGE framework featuring heterogeneous housing markets, endogenous mort-
gage defaults, and a banking sector. We find that the idiosyncratic mortgage risk shock plays an
important role in explaining the fluctuations of house prices during the 1980s and the years leading
up to the financial crisis. The same shock is also an important driving force of household loans. By
placing an occasionally binding constraint on the loan-to-value ratio via a counterfactual analysis,
we find that the overheating of the housing economy in the early 2000s and the subsequent crash
could have been alleviated, if authorities had adopted such a macroprudential policy measure. A
welfare comparison suggests that such a maximum loan-to-value ratio policy is preferable over an
augmented Taylor rule that responds to house price growth.
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1 Introduction
As we know today, the roots of the financial crisis can be traced back to the U.S. housing market.
Increasing property prices and a sharp rise in household borrowing characterized the years leading up to
the crisis. Eventually, the burst of the housing bubble was followed by a large wave of mortgage defaults
and a severe contraction of economic activity. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic expansion of household
debt in the early 2000s and the rise of the delinquency rate following the burst of the bubble.


































Figure 1: Top panel: Mortgage Debt Outstanding (MDOTHIOH, FRED). Bottom panel: Delinquency Rate on
Single-Family Residential Mortgages (DRSFRMACBS, FRED).
Our paper therefore explores three research questions. First, to what extent are house and rental prices
affected by mortgage default? Second, could the dramatic pre-crisis expansion of the housing economy
and the subsequent crash have been prevented, if authorities had followed a macroprudential loan-to-
value (LTV) ratio? Third, can an augmented Taylor rule outperform a preemptive LTV ratio policy in
terms of its welfare effects? In order to answer these questions, we construct a comprehensive Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework with various frictions and features, and estimate the
model with the help of Bayesian techniques on U.S. data.
The underlying framework in this study is a general equilibrium model, similar to those presented in Sun
and Tsang (2017), Iacoviello (2015), and Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The economy is inhabited by three
types of agents: households, entrepreneurs, and banks. There is heterogeneity in households, which is
represented by impatient and patient agents. The difference between these two types of households is
their discount factors. Impatient agents (net borrowers) discount the future more heavily than patient
households (net savers), which creates an incentive to borrow from banks. Savers supply deposits to
banks and provide borrowers with rental services. Impatient households are credit-constrained and
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decide between renting and owning a home. The supply side of the economy consists of two sectors:
consumption and housing. Entrepreneurs face a liquidity constraint and produce the final good and new
housing. The central bank sets interest rates at which banks collect deposits. Therefore, changes in the
deposit rates either contract or loosen the credit supply. Banks act as an intermediary between savers
and borrowers and are exposed to a capital adequacy constraint. Finally, the model allows borrowers to
default endogenously on their loans. We follow the approach described in Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal
(2017) to incorporate endogenous mortgage default into our model. In this setting, housing investment
is risky. An idiosyncratic risk shock determines the ex-post value of the house and, once the shock is
realized, borrowers decide whether to default on the mortgage or not based on a comparison between
the value of the house and the mortgage payment.1 To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
investigate endogenous default and macroprudential measures in a DSGE framework equipped with a
banking and rental sector.
We explicitly model a banking sector due to the following reasons. First, banks were at the heart of
the financial crisis and therefore played a key role in providing households with the necessary funds
to fuel their consumption. Second, allowing for banks adds another layer of frictions into the model
economy. As the financial sector faces a capital adequacy constraint, it will ensure that its assets side
matches its liabilities. Disruptions, caused by shocks, alter the loan supply regulated by banks and
therefore have an effect on the propagation mechanism of shocks, as shown by Iacoviello (2015) and Ge,
Li, and Zheng (2020). For this reason, combining conventional financial frictions with banking frictions
intensifies the shock responses. Iacoviello (2015) also shows, with the help of Bayesian methods, that a
model with a banking sector is preferred to one without. Third, studying LTV requirements and policies
hold important implications for the banking sector. Changing the LTV ratio, from a policy perspective,
alters the loan supply provided by banks and affects home buyers through an either increased or reduced
down payment. Thus, equipping our model with a banking sector is a crucial feature in order to analyze
the implications of a maximum LTV policy. As mentioned above, we also incorporate a rental market
into our model setup. Relaxing the assumption of a homogeneous housing market allows borrowers to
opt for rental and owner-occupied housing. This implies important substitution effects when it comes
to studying the model responses and the counterfactual analysis, as households can choose between the
two housing types.
The results of the estimated model indicate that the idiosyncratic risk shock drives 17 percent of the
variance of house prices and more than 20 percent of the variation in household loans over the business
cycle. A historical shock decomposition reveals that most of the movements of house prices and household
loans are determined by investment technology, housing technology, and intertemporal preference shocks.
1Note that our analysis abstracts from factors such as unemployment, income distributions, education and other socio-
economic variables which also influence somebody’s ability to buy a home.
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The idiosyncratic risk shock increases its importance during the 1980s and the years leading up to
the financial crisis. To assess the effectiveness of a preemptive LTV policy, we perform counterfactual
simulations of key model variables by imposing a maximum value on the LTV ratio. This is achieved
by placing an occasionally binding constraint on the LTV ratio which is now set endogenously as a
byproduct of introducing mortgage default into the model. The simulation results show that house and
rental prices would have been much lower in the mid-2000s. Furthermore, the subsequent sharp drop in
house prices would have been less severe under the preemptive LTV policy. The same holds for the rise
in household loans and residential investment, as the maximum LTV ratio causes a smaller expansion
of both time series. Finally, our counterfactual welfare comparison shows that a maximum LTV ratio
policy is preferable to an augmented Taylor rule which responds to house price growth.
This paper is linked to two fields in the literature, where the first consists of DSGE housing studies
and the other is comprised of articles analyzing the effectiveness of macroprudential policy tools. The
articles by Sun and Tsang (2017), Iacoviello (2015), and Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017) are the
most closely related to ours. Sun and Tsang (2017) develop and estimate a DSGE model to investigate
how house and rental prices respond to various shocks. Their model economy is based on the Iacoviello
and Neri (2010) framework and is complemented by a rental housing sector. The difference between this
paper and the study by Sun and Tsang (2017) is that we explicitly model a banking sector and allow
for endogenous mortgage default of borrowers. We also relax the assumption made in Iacoviello (2015)
where default is characterized by an exogenous process. Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017) estimate a
DSGE model with housing and endogenous default to shed new light on the subprime crisis and the Great
Recession. The paper studies how an increase in the rate of default and interest rate spreads, caused by
a rise in risk in the mortgage market, can trigger a recession. Modeling endogenous default explicitly, as
shown in Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017), introduces a different transmission mechanism into the
model, as opposed to the exogenous approach taken by Iacoviello (2015), where default is represented
by a wealth redistribution shock to the budget constraints of entrepreneurs, bankers and borrowers. In
comparison to Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017), we relax the assumption of a homogeneous housing
sector and explicitly introduce banks into our model. Also, our policy analysis focuses specifically on
a maximum LTV ratio and its comparison to an augmented Taylor rule that responds to house price
growth. Therefore, allowing for a rental housing market gives borrowers an alternative to owner-occupied
housing which in turn holds utility and social welfare effects.
The counterfactual policy analysis of this paper shows that the dangerous pre-crisis build-up in the U.S.
housing sector could have been effectively slowed down by implementing a maximum LTV rule. We pick
this particular rule for two reasons. First of all, it is an effective policy tool when it comes to regulating
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the loan supply. The Durante et al. (2017)2 Well-Being of U.S. Households report reveals an interesting
fact that 50 percent of renters cannot afford the down payment in order to buy their own home. In
other words, half of the renters questioned in the survey already fail at the first hurdle towards owning
a house. However, this in turn means that adjusting the down payment (i.e. the LTV ratio), has a
severe effect on the credit supply and homeownership. Second, a maximum LTV rule could have acted
as an alternative safeguard in the years leading up to the financial crisis. Markets like Hong Kong and
Canada have already adopted such an approach. In fact, countercyclical LTV policies in Hong Kong
have been established for a relatively long time in order to cool down an overheating of the property
markets. Between 1990 and 2010 the Hong Kong monetary authority stepped in and adjusted the LTV
limits several times. For example, during the global crisis periods 2008 and 2009, LTV ratios of higher
priced properties were lowered by 10 percent3 in order to bring house prices down (see Funke and Paetz
(2012)).
Canada is another famous example of using the LTV ratio in a macroprudential fashion. First of all, it is
important to mention that loans with LTV ratios greater than 80 percent have to be insured. Mortgage
insurance is provided by the government-owned Canadian Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC)
and two private companies. However, CMHC is by far the largest insurer with a market share of three
quarters. The mortgage insurance applies to all governmentally regulated lenders and covers the entire
Canadian banking sector. Banks are responsible for the majority of mortgage lending. In 2013, 74
percent of the mortgage supply originated from banks (see Krznar and Morsink (2014)). In the past and
very recent years, Canadian authorities have adjusted LTV ratios in a countercyclical way. Due to the
recession in 1991, and to stimulate residential investment, maximum LTV ratios of mortgages were raised
in 1992 from 90 to 95 percent. This pilot project was specifically introduced for first-time home buyers.
Regulations changed in 1998, which meant that mortgages with a LTV ratio of 95 percent could now be
given to all home buyers within the regional price boundaries. In the years before the global financial
crisis unfolded, macroprudential tools were substantially loosened. In 2006 it was decided that limits on
LTV ratios were allowed to climb up to 100 percent before they were changed back to 95 percent in 2008
with the outbreak of the crisis. Therefore, Canadian authorities decreased LTV ratios and tightened the
access to mortgages in response to the onset of the global financial crisis (see Allen et al. (2020)).
The policy analysis carried out in this paper is related to the macroprudential exercises performed
by Funke and Paetz (2012), Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013), Brzoza-Brzezina, Kolasa, and
Makarski (2015), Bruneau, Christensen, and Meh (2016), and Ferrero, Harrison, and Nelson (2018).
2DCCA stands for Consumer and Community Development Research Section of the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of
Consumer and Community Affairs.
3During that time, the LTV ratio was decreased from 60 to 50 percent for properties with a market value ≥ HK$ 12 million
and declined from 70 to 60 percent for properties with values of HK$ 12 million > HK$ 8 million. For more details on
the history see Funke and Paetz (2012) or Wong et al. (2011).
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The difference between the literature and this study, is the model environment and the methodological
approach. Financial frictions arise not only at the household level but also from the banking sector.
Furthermore, we combine the choice of households between renting and owning a home with the possibility
of endogenous default of household borrowers. This provides us with a realistic set-up to study the effects
of macroprudential policies. In order to perform our counterfactual analysis, we impose a maximum
LTV ratio on the impatient households’ side. Therefore, this type of agents face an occasionally binding
constraint when it comes to the maximum amount they can borrow. All other constraints in the model,
including entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraint and bankers’ capital adequacy constraint, are assumed to
be binding following the literature. This is not only consistent with the evidence of a sharp increase in
household borrowing in the years leading up to the financial crisis, but also keeps the model environment
tractable and allows us to disentangle the effect of a maximum LTV policy.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the model economy. The data and estimation
output are described in section 3. Section 4 discusses the impulse response functions, the variance and
historical shock decomposition. The macroprudential policy analysis with the counterfactual analysis
and welfare analysis is illustrated in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
The model economy is related to those outlined in Sun and Tsang (2017), Iacoviello (2015), and Iacoviello
and Neri (2010). However, this paper relaxes the assumption of exogenous default. Mortgage default
is introduced as outlined in Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017). The model accommodates three
different types of agents: households, banks, and entrepreneurs. Furthermore, nominal price rigidities
are introduced at the retail level and a central bank sets interest rates according to a Taylor rule. Patient
households transform their owner-occupied housing units into rental housing services and lease them to
impatient households. Each economic agent is represented by a continuum of measure one.
2.1 Patient Households
Patient households discount at rate βH . They choose consumption CH,t and housing HH,t, and derive
disutility from working. N cH,t and NhH,t are the hours supplied to the consumption and construction
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(2)
External habit formation in consumption is represented by the parameter η. Two shocks enter the
utility function of the patient household: the intertemporal preference (or aggregate spending) shock
Ap,t and the housing demand shock Aj,t, both follow an AR(1) process. The aggregate spending shock
simultaneously effects the saver’s choices of consumption and housing. j determines the preference share
in housing and τ stands for the labor supply parameter. The way the disutility of labor is defined (κNH ,
χH ≥ 0) allows for less than perfect mobility between sectors. Turning to the budget constraint, savers
deposit Dt and receive a predetermined gross return of RH,t. Patient households accumulate owner-
occupied housing HH,t and rental housing Hr,t priced at qt. The term DIVt refers to the lump-sum
dividends paid by retailers. W cH,t and WhH,t are real wages patient households earn in the consumption
and housing sectors, respectively. πt is the gross money inflation. Patient households rent capital to
entrepreneurs, which is used to produce the final good and new homes. KcH,t and KhH,t represent therefore
the capital stock in the consumption and construction sectors with their respective utilization rates of
zcKH,t and zhKH,t. AK,t is an AR(1) investment-specific technology shock that measures the marginal
cost of producing capital used in the consumption sector. Patient agents receive a rental rate of capital
denoted by RcM,t and RhM,t. They convert their rental property into rental services Zt, which they then
lease to borrowers. This transformation process is captured by the production function Zt = ΩrHr,t. The
parameter Ωr measures the efficiency in converting rental homes into rental services. Patient households
receive rental income according to qr,t ΩrHr,t at a rental rate qr,t. The terms accKH,t, achKH,t, and acDH,t
are the respective (quadratic and convex) external adjustment costs for capital and deposits. As habits,
adjustment costs are assumed to be external. Owner-occupied and rental housing depreciates at rates δH
and δHr. The capital depreciation functions are given by δcKH,t and δhKH,t. The exact specifications of
adjustment costs, capital depreciation functions, marginal utilities, and the resulting first order conditions
can be found in the appendix.
2.2 Impatient Households
Impatient households are credit-constrained and discount the future at a rate βS < βH . Furthermore,
they have access to the loan market and use their housing stock HS,t as collateral. As a share of borrowers
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face the default on their mortgages, lenders pay a monitoring cost µ and seize a fraction Gt(ω̄t) of the
borrowers’ housing stock. The share of repaid loans to lenders is represented by the expression 1−Ft(ω̄t)
and Γt+1(ω̄t+1) stands for the expected share of housing value, including monitoring costs, that lenders
receive after default. The decision of borrower households to default on their mortgages is determined
by the threshold value, ω̄t, of an idiosyncratic risk shock ωt. The exact mechanism of endogenous default
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The CES housing aggregator H̃S,t in the borrower’s utility function captures the assumption that owner-
occupied and rental homes are substitutes. In other words, the impatient agent’s demand for housing is a
composite index consisting of owner-occupied and rental housing. The constant elasticity of substitution
between both housing types is represented by the parameter κS . θS is the preference share of mortgaged
housing, and 1− θS the weight on rental services. N cS,t and NhS,t are hours supplied to the consumption
and construction sectors. The terms W cS,t and Whs,t are real wages impatient households earn in the
consumption and housing sectors, respectively. The expenditure side of the budget constraint includes
consumption CS,t, the accumulation of mortgaged housing HS,t, payments for rental services Zt priced
at qr,t, and loan payments LS,t at a predetermined gross return RS,t under a participation constraint of
the lenders. The term acSS,t reflects the loan adjustment costs of the impatient households.
As outlined in Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017), impatient households face a threshold of default,
denoted by ω̄t, and total housing investment is equally distributed across the members of the household.
Each borrower household enters a contract with the lender before the idiosyncratic shock ωit+1 material-
izes. The shock determines the ex-post housing value ωit+1qt+1HS,t, which captures the risk of investing
into a house. The shock ωit+1 is i.i.d. across all household members and follows a log-normal distribution
described by a cumulative distribution function Ft+1(ωit+1). In order to rule out aggregate uncertainty,
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the expected value of the idiosyncratic shock is 1 in every period. We assume that the riskiness of housing
investment can adjust over time, implying that the standard deviation σω,t of logωit is exposed to an
exogenous shock. Once the idiosyncratic shock has materialized, borrowers choose either to default on
their mortgages or to fulfill their repayment obligations. The threshold ω̄t is implicitly defined as:
RSz,t+1LS,t = ω̄t+1(1− δH)qt+1HS,tπt+1, (5)
where RSz,t+1 is the state-contingent interest rate that borrowers pay at time t+1 on the loans LS,t taken










where σω,t = σ̄ωAω,t, σ̄ω is the steady-state standard deviation, and Aω,t is an AR(1) process.
The collateral constraint (7) shows that impatient agents borrow against a fraction of the expected future
value of their homes. The inertia parameter ρS accounts for a slow adjustment of the constraint (see
Iacoviello (2015)) and Γt+1(ω̄t+1) − µGt+1(ω̄t+1) represents the LTV ratio. This specification of the
borrowing constraint is consistent with the empirical evidence that aggregate debt measures tend to lag
changes in house prices:






Note that the above formulation of the impatient agent’s housing choice does not imply that borrowers
live simultaneously in a mortgaged and a rented house. Instead, we assume that some fraction of
borrower-type households choose to live in a rental house and the rest in an owner-occupied home. For
this reason, the composite index H̃S,t represents the aggregate preferences of all household members
with respect to each type of housing services. This is equivalent to the “within a family” approach of
Gertler and Karadi (2011). As before the borrower’s adjustment costs, marginal utilities, and equilibrium
conditions can be found in the appendix.
2.3 Bankers
Bankers with a discount rate βB play an important role in the economy as they collect deposits from
patient households on which they pay the interest rate RH,t set by the central bank. In addition to
this, bankers issue loans to entrepreneurs and impatient households, denoted by LE,t and LS,t. Bankers





βtB(1− η) log(CB,t − ηCB,t−1), (8)




















Bankers consume CB,t and hold assets and liabilities in the form of deposits and loans. Following
Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), we assume a one-
period mortgage contract. Banks demand the predetermined interest rate RS,t. The shock ω is described
by the probability density function f(ω). Recall that the standard deviation of ω is subject to an
exogenous shock, making it change over time. The return on total loans can be split up into two parts:
the housings stock of borrowers adjusted for monitoring costs and the depreciation of defaulting household
borrowers (first term on the right-hand side of Equation (10)), and the loan repayment of non-defaulting
household borrowers (second term on the right-hand side of Equation (10)). Once the idiosyncratic and
aggregate shocks have materialized, the state-contingent mortgage rate RSz,t and the threshold value ω̄t
are set. Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017) define the expected value of the idiosyncratic shock for










The exact specification of the quadratic adjustment costs for deposits (Dt) and loans (LS,t, LE,t) can be
found in the appendix. Beside the budget constraint, bankers face a capital adequacy constraint, which
is defined as:
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+ (1− γ)(1− ρD)Lt. (13)
The total level of assets is given by the sum Lt = LE,t+LS,t. The left hand side of the capital adequacy
constraint shows the net equity of banks. This expression has to be equal or greater than last periods
equity plus some fraction of bank assets. The non-zero inertia parameter ρD ensures a partial adjustment
of bank capital and a deviation from its capital-to-asset ratio (long-run) target 1− γ.
2.4 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs with a discount rate βE produce the final good Yt and new homes IHt. The factors of
input are labor and capital supplied by households, land ℓt, intermediate inputs KB,t, and capital KE,t
produced by entrepreneurs themselves. They maximize:
∞∑
t=0
βtE(1− η) log(CE,t − ηCE,t−1), (14)










































and a borrowing constraint of the form:















As we can see from the budget constraint, entrepreneurs pay households the sector-specific real wages
W cH,t, WhH,t, W cS,t and WhS,t. Inflation in the consumption sector is denoted by πt and pℓ,t is the price of
land. The terms acKE,t and acEE,t are the respective adjustment costs for capital and loans. δKE,t is
the capital depreciation rate. Retailers purchase consumption goods from entrepreneurs and sell them
at a markup Xt. The term LE,t denotes the loans that banks extend to entrepreneurs, with a gross
return RE,t. As impatient households, entrepreneurs face a borrowing constraint and borrow against a
fraction of their capital and have to pay their workers upfront. The parameter ρE is the inertia in the
entrepreneurs liquidity constraint. The term AME,t is an AR(1) process that captures the entrepreneurs’
LTV ratio andmK stands for the LTV requirement on capital. The parametermN captures the fraction of
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wage bills that must be paid in advance. While we model the LTV ratio of the borrower-type households
in an endogenous manner, we impose an exogenous process on the entrepreneurs’ LTV ratio, which is





















where AZ,t and AH,t are AR(1) processes that capture the technology shock in the consumption and
housing sectors.
2.5 Nominal Rigidities and Monetary Policy
The existence of retailers, who operate under monopolistic competition, allows for sticky prices in the
consumption sector. Nominal price adjustments in the retail sector entail implicit costs, which follow
Calvo-style contracts (see Calvo (1983)). Consistent with the literature we assume that house prices are
flexible.4 Patient households own retailers and receive dividends in the form of DIVt = Xt−1Xt Yt. The
resulting Phillips curves takes the form:
log(πt)− ιπ log(πt−1) = βH{Et [log(πt+1)]− ιπ log(πt)} −








As described in Smets and Wouters (2003), Equation (19) implies partial indexation to lagged inflation
of prices which cannot be re-optimized. Therefore, setting the elasticity ιπ equal to zero leaves us with
the standard forward looking Phillips curve. Each period a fraction of retailers Θπ cannot reset their
prices optimally and υπ is an identically and independently distributed cost-push shocks with zero mean
and variance σ2π. In order to close the model, we assume that the central bank sets interest rates RH,t
according to the following Taylor rule:













where interest rates react to inflation and GDP growth. 1βH is the steady-state real interest rate on
deposits; υR,t stands for an identically and independently distributed monetary policy shock with zero
4See for example the discussion by Barsky, House, and Kimball (2007).
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mean and variance σ2r ; AS,t is a highly persistent AR(1) shock process, which measures long-lasting
inflation deviations from its steady state level. This could be due to changes in the central bank’s
inflation target.
2.6 Market Clearing




+ IKh,t +KB,t = Yt −ACt, (21)
IHt = HH,t − (1− δH)HH,t−1 + HS,t − (1− δH)[1− µGt(ω̄t)]HS,t−1 + Hr,t − (1− δHr)Hr,t−1, (22)
where IHt is the sum of the individual housing stocks of the impatient and patient households. The
goods sector produces (aggregate) consumption given by Ct = CH,t + CS,t + CB,t + CE,t. Business and
residential investment is obtained by adding up the respective capital components accumulated by savers
and entrepreneurs. Hence, business investment is defined as IKc,t = KcH,t − (1− δcKH,t)KcH,t−1 +KE,t −
(1 − δKE,t)KE,t−1 and residential investment as IKh,t = KhH,t − (1 − δhKH,t)KH,t−1, and intermediate
inputs KB,t. In this study land is fixed and normalized to one. The term ACt represents the aggregate
adjustment costs in the economy.
2.7 AR(1) Shock Processes
There are in total eight AR(1) structural shocks, which are: the housing preference shock Aj,t, the LTV
ratio shock of entrepreneurs AME,t, the technology shock of capital AK,t, the intertemporal preference
(or aggregate spending) shock Ap,t, the technology shocks in the consumption sector AZ,t and housing
sector AH,t, the inflation target shock AS,t, and the idiosyncratic risk shock Aω,t:
logAj,t = ρj logAj,t−1 + υj,t with υj,t ∼ N(0, σ2j ), (23)
logAME,t = ρm logAME,t−1 + υm,t with υm,t ∼ N(0, σ2m), (24)
logAK,t = ρk logAK,t−1 + υk,t with υk,t ∼ N(0, σ2k), (25)
logAp,t = ρp logAp,t−1 + υp,t with υp,t ∼ N(0, σ2p), (26)
logAZ,t = ρc logAZ,t−1 + υc,t with υc,t ∼ N(0, σ2c ), (27)
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logAH,t = ρh logAH,t−1 + υh,t with υh,t ∼ N(0, σ2h), (28)
logAS,t = ρs logAS,t−1 + υs,t with υs,t ∼ N(0, σ2s), (29)
logAω,t = ρω logAω,t−1 + υω,t with υω,t ∼ N(0, σ2ω). (30)
3 Parameter Estimates
3.1 Data Description
We estimate the model with U.S. quarterly data on twelve observable variables from 1975 to 2008.5
The observables include real consumption, real nonresidential fixed investment, real residential fixed
investment, loans to businesses, loans to households, real house prices, real rental prices, hours in the
consumption sector, hours in the housing sector, nominal interest rates, inflation, and total factor pro-
ductivity. Figure 2 plots the data series.
Personal consumption expenditures, nonresidential fixed investment, and residential fixed investment are
collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and then log transformed and detrended with
a quadratic trend. Real house prices and real rental prices are constructed from the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (FHFA)’s all-transactions index and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)’s rent of
primary residence index. Both indices are seasonally adjusted, deflated with the consumer price index
(all items less shelter), log transformed, and detrended with a quadratic trend.
We obtain hours in the consumption sector by multiplying average weekly hours of production workers
to total nonfarm payrolls less all employees in the construction sector and then dividing by the civilian
noninstitutional population. Hours in the housing sector are obtained by multiplying average weekly
hours of construction workers to all employees in the construction sector and then dividing by the
civilian noninstitutional population. All data series are collected from the Federal Reserve Economic
Data (FRED). Hours in both sectors are then log transformed. Nominal interest rates are the secondary
market rate of 3-month treasury bill from FRED. Inflation is the percentage change in the nonfarm
business sector implicit price deflator from FRED. Both nominal interest rates and inflation rates are
demeaned.
We follow Iacoviello (2015) and construct the measure of total factor productivity from the utilization-
5We choose to end our sample at 2008 for two reasons. First, our focus in this paper is on the overheating of the housing
mortgage market preceding the Great Recession. Second, the policy interest rate was cut to near zero at the end of 2008,
which further complicates the model. The zero lower bound of the policy rate is an interesting topic that has been studied
by Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), Bianchi and Melosi (2017), and Kulish, Morley, and Robinson (2017), among others,
but is beyond the scope of this paper.
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adjusted quarterly growth rate of TFP of Fernald (2014) by integrating the growth rates back to levels,


















































































We estimate the model parameters using Bayesian techniques. Given that our data are demeaned, a
subset of the parameters need to be calibrated in the estimation procedure. Table 1 summarizes the
calibrated parameters. The discount factor βH is fixed at 0.9925 to pin down the 3 percent steady-state
annual return on deposits. The other three discount factors βB , βE , and βS are set at 0.945, 0.94, and
0.94 respectively, implying a 5 percent steady-state annual return on loans. This assumption ensures
that for small shocks the collateral constraint binds in the neighbourhood of the steady state. Capital
depreciation rates are set at δKE = δcKH = 0.035 in the consumption sector and δhKH = 0.040 in the
housing sector. The leverage parameter on capital is set at mK = 0.9. We assume that labor in both
sectors needs to be fully paid in advance and choose mN = 1. Bankers’ liabilities to assets ratios are
set at γE = γS = 0.9 (see Iacoviello (2015)). Depreciation rates of owner-occupied housing and rental
housing are assumed to be δH = 0.01 and δHr = 0.02. In other words, housing occupied by a renter
depreciates more rapidly than housing occupied by an owner, due to moral hazard. For simplicity, we
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assume a one-to-one conversion of rental homes into rental services, i.e., Ωr = 1.
We set the capital share in production at α = 0.42 and the weight of housing in the utility function
at j = 0.18 to pin down the shares of consumption (67%), business investment (27%), and housing
investment (6%) in GDP and the steady-state price-rent ratio of about 36. The labor supply parameter
is set at τ = 2 (see Iacoviello (2015)). The input share parameters in the production function are set at
µc = 0.35 and µh = µb = µl = 0.10 (see Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Davis and Heathcote (2005)).
The markup parameter is set at its typical value X = 1.15 (see Corsetti et al. (2013)). The inflation
target is highly persistent but its persistence is found hard to estimate in previous studies. We follow
the usual practice to set the persistence parameter at ρs = 0.95. The steady-state standard deviation of
the idiosyncratic risk shock is set at σ̄ω = 0.1 (see Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017)).
We choose to set the monitoring cost parameter at µ = 0.04. This value, together with other parameters,
implies a steady-state default rate of residential mortgages of 5 percent and a steady-state LTV ratio of
about 0.84. The implied default rate is specific to borrowers in our model and is thus slightly higher
than the observed delinquency rate over our sample period.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value
Discount factor Saver (S) βH 0.9925
Discount factor Borrower (B) βS 0.94
Discount factor Banker βB 0.945
Discount factor Entrepreneur (E) βE 0.94
Total capital share in production α 0.42
Capital LTV ratio, E mK 0.9
Wage bill paid in advance mN 1
Bankers’ liabilities to assets ratios γE , γS 0.9
Housing preference share j 0.18
Capital depreciation rates consump. sector δKE , δcKH 0.035
Capital depreciation rates housing sector δhKH 0.040
Depreciation owner-occupied housing δH 0.01
Depreciation rental housing δHr 0.02
Rental home conversion efficiency Ωr 1
Labor supply parameter τ 2
Monitoring cost parameter µ 0.04
Input share parameters µh, µb, µℓ 0.10
µc 0.35
Markup X 1.15
Persistence of inflation target ρs 0.95
Steady-state SD of idiosyncratic risk σ̄ω 0.1
16
3.3 Prior and Posterior Distributions
Tables 2 and 3 present the prior and posterior distributions of remaining parameters in the structural
model and shock processes. The posterior statistics are based on 1,000,000 draws from the posterior
distribution.
The prior distributions for the habit formation parameter (η), adjustment cost parameters (ϕ’s), inertia
parameters (ρ’s), wage share parameter (σ), and curvature parameters (ζ’s) are taken from Iacoviello
(2015). For the labor disutility parameters (κ’s and χ’s), Taylor rule parameters (Ψ’s), and price rigidity
parameters (Θπ and ιπ), the prior distributions are taken from Iacoviello and Neri (2010). The prior
distributions for parameters concerning the substitution between owner-occupied housing and rental
housing (θs and κS) are obtained from Sun and Tsang (2017) with the exception that we impose a
tighter prior on the parameter θs.6 The persistence of AR(1) shocks is assumed to have a Beta prior
with mean 0.8 and standard deviation 0.1. The standard deviation of structural shocks and measurement
errors follows an Inverse Gamma distribution with mean 0.005 and standard deviation 0.025. These
specifications are largely consistent with previous studies.
6The parameter θs turns out to be a key determinant of the relative steady-state values of HH , HS , and Hr. While the
data that we use for estimation are aggregated and do not provide any information about the relative size of the housing
stock owned by the two types of households, we try to use data from other sources to match the relative values of HH , HS ,
and Hr. First, we match the model-implied homeownership rate, i.e., (HH +HS)/(HH +HS +Hr), with imputed rental
of owner-occupied housing divided by its sum with rental of tenant-occupied housing, where both variables are published
by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A2013C1A027NBEA and
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DTENRC1A027NBEA. Second, we compute the model-implied households’ equity share
as 1− LS/q/(HH +HS) and match it with the share of homeowner equity in real estate property in the U.S. published
by Statista Research Department (available at https://www.statista.com/statistics/375884/share-of-homeowner-equity-
in-real-estate-usa/). By imposing a relatively tight prior on the parameter θs, we are able to match the model-implied
homeownership rate and equity share with their data counterparts fairly well. Our estimated model implies a steady-state
homeownership rate of 86% (compared to about 78% in the data) and a steady-state equity share of 74% (compared to
68% in the data).
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Table 2: Prior and Posterior Distributions, Structural Parameters
Parameter Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Density Mean Std Mean 5% Median 95%
Habit in consumption η Beta 0.500 0.100 0.6965 0.6587 0.6972 0.7334
Deposit adj. cost, Banks ϕDB Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.0446 0.0189 0.0429 0.0698
Deposit adj. cost, S ϕDH Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.1877 0.1240 0.1854 0.2540
Capital adj. cost consum. sector, E ϕKE Gamma 1.000 0.500 2.2396 1.8134 2.2195 2.6807
Capital adj. cost consum. sector, S ϕKC Gamma 1.000 0.500 3.8722 3.5309 3.8678 4.2474
Capital adj. cost housing sector, S ϕKH Gamma 1.000 0.500 0.6661 0.4780 0.6548 0.8541
Loans to E adj. cost, Banks ϕEB Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.0623 0.0274 0.0604 0.0958
Loans to E adj. cost, E ϕEE Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.5294 0.3171 0.5270 0.7466
Loans to B adj. cost, Banks ϕSB Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.1360 0.0501 0.1300 0.2139
Loans to B adj. cost, B ϕSS Gamma 0.250 0.100 0.3766 0.2251 0.3743 0.5353
Inertia in capital adequacy constraint ρD Beta 0.250 0.100 0.7936 0.7612 0.7946 0.8266
Inertia in borrowing constraint, E ρE Beta 0.250 0.100 0.4602 0.3927 0.4601 0.5253
Inertia in borrowing constraint, B ρS Beta 0.250 0.100 0.8234 0.7746 0.8258 0.8754
Wage share, B σ Beta 0.300 0.100 0.7365 0.6628 0.7381 0.8094
Curvature for utilization function, E ζE Beta 0.200 0.100 0.3444 0.2548 0.3401 0.4306
Curvature for utilization function, S ζH Beta 0.200 0.100 0.2502 0.1957 0.2498 0.3010
Inverse elast. of subst. across hours, S κNH Beta 0.500 0.075 0.5788 0.4761 0.5800 0.6844
Inverse elast. of subst. across hours, B κNS Beta 0.500 0.075 0.7352 0.6609 0.7374 0.8138
Elasticity of hours, S χH Gamma 0.500 0.100 0.4047 0.2587 0.3978 0.5490
Elasticity of hours, B χS Gamma 0.500 0.100 0.3232 0.2241 0.3186 0.4200
Taylor rule, inflation parameter Ψπ Normal 1.500 0.100 1.4238 1.2855 1.4137 1.5496
Taylor rule, interest rate parameter ΨR Beta 0.750 0.100 0.6442 0.5839 0.6461 0.7046
Taylor rule, output parameter ΨY Normal 0.000 0.100 0.3733 0.2767 0.3737 0.4677
Price indexation ιπ Beta 0.500 0.200 0.0735 0.0095 0.0659 0.1347
Calvo price Θπ Beta 0.667 0.050 0.5617 0.5049 0.5632 0.6169
Weight owner-occup. housing θS Beta 0.500 0.050 0.7261 0.6778 0.7269 0.7770
Elasticity of substitution κS Normal 2.000 0.500 1.1498 1.0010 1.1335 1.2979
The estimate of η is 0.7, which indicates a high degree of habit formation across agents. The wage share
of credit-constrained households σ is slightly above 0.7, which is higher than most estimates reported
in previous studies. For example, this value is around 0.2 in Jappelli (1990) and Iacoviello and Neri
(2010). The reason that we find a higher fraction of net borrowers in our setting might be that we have
separated entrepreneurs and bankers from net savers and modeled them independently. Nevertheless,
our estimate is consistent with Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017). Both labor supply parameters κHN and
κSN are significantly different from zero, which indicates less than perfect labor mobility across sectors.
The Taylor rule parameter estimates are in line with previous studies. The Calvo price parameter Θπ is
close to 0.6, which means that about 40 percent of retailers are able to re-optimize prices in each period
and 60 percent are not able to do so. Credit-constrained households put a relatively high weight, about
73 percent, on owner-occupied housing in their utility function. The elasticity of substitution between
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owner-occupied housing and rental housing is lower than its prior mean. All of the AR(1) shocks are
estimated to be highly persistent.
Table 3: Prior and Posterior Distributions, Shock Processes
Parameter Prior Distribution Posterior Distribution
Density Mean Std Mean 5% Median 95%
Autocor. housing demand shock ρj Beta 0.800 0.100 0.8362 0.8008 0.8368 0.8703
Autocor. investment shock ρk Beta 0.800 0.100 0.7489 0.7056 0.7499 0.7925
Autocor. LTV shock, E ρme Beta 0.800 0.100 0.9780 0.9727 0.9782 0.9835
Autocor. preference shock ρp Beta 0.800 0.100 0.9992 0.9985 0.9993 0.9999
Autocor. tech. shock, consum. ρzc Beta 0.800 0.100 0.9774 0.9618 0.9786 0.9938
Autocor. tech. shock, housing ρzh Beta 0.800 0.100 0.9749 0.9685 0.9753 0.9813
Autocor. Idiosyncratic risk shock ρω Beta 0.800 0.100 0.9421 0.9070 0.9427 0.9762
Std housing demand shock σj Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0243 0.0213 0.0242 0.0272
Std investment shock σk Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0204 0.0173 0.0203 0.0236
Std LTV shock, E σme Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0167 0.0145 0.0166 0.0188
Std preference shock σp Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0364 0.0313 0.0362 0.0412
Std tech. shock, consum. σzc Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0074 0.0067 0.0074 0.0081
Std tech. shock, housing σzh Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0193 0.0172 0.0192 0.0213
Std monetary policy shock, (iid) σr Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0033 0.0028 0.0033 0.0037
Std monetary policy shock σs Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010
Std cost-push shock, (iid) σπ Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0081 0.0062 0.0079 0.0099
Std idiosyncratic risk shock σω Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0498 0.0408 0.0494 0.0587
Std measurement error σNC Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.0312 0.0278 0.0311 0.0344
Std measurement error σNH Inv.gamma 0.005 0.025 0.1229 0.1096 0.1225 0.1356
Note: To make sure that the number of shocks is more than or equal to the number of data series, we impose independently and
identically distributed measurement errors on hours in the consumption and housing sectors, with mean zero and standard deviations
σNC and σNH .
4 Results
In this section we present the properties of the estimated model, including impulse response functions
(IRFs), variance forecast error decomposition, and historical shock decomposition.
4.1 Impulse Response Functions
We plot the IRFs of key model variables in Figures 3 to 7. All IRFs are computed in percent deviations

































































Figure 3: Impulse response to a one standard deviation idiosyncratic risk shock
The idiosyncratic risk shock is one of the key structural shocks in our model. It determines the ex-post
value of housing and affects net borrowers’ decision on whether or not to default on their mortgages.
Figure 3 shows the responses of nine key model variables to a one standard deviation idiosyncratic risk
shock. When such a shock hits the economy, credit-constrained households are more likely to choose to
default on their mortgages. Loans to households decline and the loan-to-value ratio also decreases. Both
house prices and rental prices tend to decrease. Credit-constrained households would choose more rental
housing. Due to the drop in house prices, unconstrained households would opt to own more housing. All
three components of aggregate demand decrease, with the largest drop in residential investment, followed
by business investment and consumption. The impact on inflation and nominal interest rate is small.
Figure 4 shows the responses of variables to a one standard deviation housing preference shock. Following
a positive housing preference shock, residential investment increases. Credit-constrained households face
a higher demand for both types of housing and unconstrained households face a higher demand for
owner-occupied housing. The higher demand drives up both house prices and rental prices. Due to the
wealth effect, consumption expands and inflation also increases. The central bank adjusts the nominal
interest rate up as a response to the increase in GDP and inflation. However, we notice that the impact
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of a housing preference shock is very small in magnitude, compared to previous studies. For example,
in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the housing demand shock explains a quarter of the volatility of housing
investment and house prices. As Iacoviello and Neri (2010) point out, the housing preference shock is
hard to interpret; it might capture all the disturbances that the model fails to identify. Interestingly, our
model does not rely on the housing preference shock to explain the business cycle fluctuations of housing













































































Figure 4: Impulse response to a one standard deviation housing preference shock
Figure 5 illustrates the impact of a one standard deviation housing technology shock. A technological
advance in the housing sector drives residential investment up significantly and makes both types of
housing less expensive. Households choose to have more of both owner-occupied housing and rental





























































Figure 5: Impulse response to a one standard deviation housing technology shock
Figure 6 presents the responses of model variables to a one standard deviation intertemporal preference
shock. Following a positive intertemporal preference shock, households’ aggregate spending increases.
They demand more consumption and housing. Both types of housing become more expensive. Due to
the increase in housing value, credit-constrained households have access to more loans and they are less
likely to default on their mortgages. The loan-to-value ratio decreases. Inflation increases and the central































































Figure 6: Impulse response to a one standard deviation intertemporal preference shock
Figure 7 demonstrates the impact of a one standard deviation monetary policy shock. As a result of such
a shock, the nominal interest rate increases, which dampens all three components of aggregate demand
and drives both house prices and rental prices down. Inflation follows the same behavior and experiences
a decrease. Due to the higher return on deposits, unconstrained households are more willing to lend to
constrained households through the banking sector. Given higher loans to households, credit-constrained



























































Figure 7: Impulse response to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock
4.2 Variance and Historical Shock Decomposition
Table 4 presents the variance forecast error decomposition for a set of key model variables. A notable
feature of the variance decomposition result is that the housing preference shock does not explain much
of the variation in housing investment or house prices. Instead, the shock plays an important role in the
rental housing market; it explains 44 percent of the variation in rental prices. More than two thirds of
the variation in real consumption is driven by the intertemporal preference shock. More than 40% of
the fluctuations in real business investment is explained by the investment technology shock. One third
of the variation in real residential investment is driven by the technology shock in the housing sector.
The idiosyncratic risk shock determines the endogenous loan-to-value ratio and explains 13 percent of
the changes in the default rate. It also explains 17 percent and 13 percent of the variation in house
prices and the size of the owner-occupied housing market, respectively. The highly persistent inflation
target shock plays an important role in our model. It explains one third of the variation in loans to
households and accounts for around 40% of the fluctuations of the default rate, and both the price and
the size of the owner-occupied housing market. We can see that the idiosyncratic risk shock plays only
a minor role in explaining the variations in consumption and business investment. This is consistent
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with the findings of Lambertini, Nuguer, and Uysal (2017). As we do not include the crisis period after
the housing market collapse, our estimation is therefore unable to capture the transmission of shocks
from the mortgage sector to the rest of the economy. Furthermore, once the idiosyncratic risk shock has
materialized, households will opt to default on their mortgages in order to remain on their consumption
path.
Table 4: Variance Forecast Error Decomposition
Housing pref. IK tech LTV Inter. pref. Consum. tech
υj υk υm υp υc
Consumption 0.00 3.22 4.66 70.70 15.13
Buss. Investment 0.00 41.87 13.15 0.08 0.04
Resi. Investment 0.42 0.88 15.80 2.36 3.40
House Prices 1.39 0.08 6.43 0.48 3.82
Rental Prices 44.07 0.18 3.18 23.55 6.07
Default Prob. 0.04 4.09 7.08 13.63 3.33
Owner-Occ. Housing 0.06 4.41 9.57 11.09 2.39
Rental Housing 3.59 2.35 0.10 27.40 6.53
LTV Ratio 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.34 0.12
Loans to Households 0.25 4.33 4.54 18.13 6.29
Inflation 0.14 0.63 32.72 9.86 4.01
Interest Rate 0.00 25.92 2.75 2.20 0.02
Housing tech Monetary Infl. target Cost-push Idio. Risk
υh υr υs υπ υω
Consumption 0.08 0.52 0.41 5.24 0.03
Buss. Investment 0.04 20.15 4.20 20.44 0.03
Resi. Investment 31.17 7.32 22.92 8.73 7.00
House Prices 11.26 16.71 41.39 1.40 17.05
Rental Prices 2.36 5.65 9.63 0.11 5.20
Default Prob. 0.25 13.28 41.09 3.77 13.43
Owner-Occ. Housing 0.28 15.27 41.83 1.62 13.49
Rental Housing 1.66 4.54 27.88 15.68 10.26
LTV Ratio 0.00 0.18 0.82 0.24 98.21
Loans to Households 0.07 8.65 31.12 5.28 21.32
Inflation 0.17 9.27 22.19 1.43 19.59
Interest Rate 0.58 47.34 2.57 17.07 1.55
We plot the historical shock decompositions of house prices and loans to households in Figures 8 and 9.
Most of the historical movements in house prices are driven by the investment and housing technology
shocks. The idiosyncratic risk shock matters during the 1980s and over the few years right before the
Great Recession.
The combination of idiosyncratic risk, monetary policy, investment technology, and intertemporal pref-
erence shocks dominates the historical movements in loans to households. During the 1980s and over the
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few years right before the Great Recession, the idiosyncratic risk shock plays an important role. From
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the other shocks become more important instead.




















Figure 8: Historical shock decomposition of house prices





















Figure 9: Historical shock decomposition of loans to households
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5 Macroprudential Policy Analysis
Unlike in Iacoviello and Neri (2010) and Iacoviello (2015) where the LTV ratio is assumed to be a
constant, we model credit-constrained households’ LTV ratio endogenously in this paper. While there
is no data available to match the LTV ratio specific to credit-constrained households, its counterpart
implied by our DSGE model shows significant variation between 1975 and 2008. As the upper left panel
of Figure 11 shows, the model-implied LTV ratio spikes around 1979 and 2005 and falls sharply before
the Great Recession. It is widely agreed that the dangerous excess of unregulated mortgage lending is
the primary driver of the rapid growth in house prices in the early 2000s and the subsequent housing
crisis. In this section, through a counterfactual analysis, we examine whether the house price run-up and
the subsequent crash could have been alleviated by a maximum LTV ratio policy. We also compare the
maximum LTV ratio policy to a Taylor rule that responds to house price growth.
5.1 A Maximum LTV Ratio Policy
We impose a maximum value on the LTV ratio of credit-constrained households at 0.85. Since the model-
implied LTV ratio, as Figure 11 shows, is higher than 0.85 only around 1979, in the late 1980s, and in
the mid-2000s, this constraint will be occasionally binding. We adopt the OccBin toolkit developed by
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) to simulate the model variables from the estimated smoothed shocks and
model parameters, assuming that the LTV ratio cannot exceed the maximum value.7 The true model
variables and their counterfactual counterparts are plotted in Figures 10 and 11 with solid and dashed
lines respectively.
Among the twelve observable variables, residential investment, loans to households, house prices, rental
prices, and hours in the housing sector are heavily affected by the maximum LTV ratio policy. If such
a maximum LTV ratio policy had been imposed, both house prices and rental prices would have been
much lower in the mid-2000s. For example, when the actual house prices reach the peak (10 percent
higher than the steady-state level) in the first quarter of 2006, the counterfactual house prices would
have been only 1 percent higher than the steady-state level. The subsequent drop in house prices would
therefore have been less deep. The rental prices would have experienced a mild increase rather than a
decrease after 2005.
7OccBin relies on different regime specifications of the underlying model. In one regime, the constraint of interest is
binding and in the other the occasionally binding constraint is slack. A piecewise linear perturbation approach is then
applied to obtain the solution to the occasionally binding constraint problem. The solution algorithm rests on two central
requirements. First, the Blanchard-Kahn conditions of the existence of a rational expectations solution have to be satisfied
under the reference regime (see Blanchard and Kahn (1980)). Second, once a shock shifts the economy away from the
reference regime towards the alternative regime, it is assumed that agents do not expect any more shocks in the future.
This assumption is therefore similar to the concept of a MIT shock. See Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017) for more details















































































Figure 10: Counterfactual observable variables with maximum LTV ratio at 0.85
While variables presented in Figure 10 are observables that we use to estimate the model parameters,
those in Figure 11 are not directly observable but are implied by the estimated model. If a maximum LTV
ratio policy had been imposed, net savers or unconstrained households in the economy would have chosen
to own more housing and net borrowers would have the option to rent more housing in the mid-2000s.
Interestingly, neither savers’ nor borrowers’ utility would have been negatively impacted over the entire
sample period. The availability of the rental housing market makes it possible for credit-constrained











































Figure 11: Counterfactual model-implied variables with maximum LTV ratio at 0.85
5.2 LTV Ratio Policy versus Augmented Taylor Rule
We now compare the maximum LTV ratio policy, in the form of an occasionally binding constraint
affecting the impatient household’s borrowing capacity, to an augmented Taylor rule with response to
house price growth in the following form:


















where ΨQ measures the responsiveness of nominal interest rates to the percent change in real house
prices. Sun and Tsang (2014) show that the value of this parameter estimated with U.S. data is around
zero. In other words, there is no evidence that the U.S. monetary policy has been responding to house
price growth. There has been, however, considerable debate on the role of asset prices in the formulation
of monetary policy; see Bernanke and Gertler (2001). While many studies are against monetary policy
responding to asset prices, many others are in favor of it. Kontonikas and Ioannidis (2005) suggest
that taking into account stock and house price misalignments helps improve the overall macroeconomic
stability. Finocchiaro and Von Heideken (2013) find that it is optimal for monetary policy to respond to
house price inflation based on their estimation of the model of Iacoviello (2005) for the U.S., U.K., and
Japan.
Our objective in this section is not to argue whether or not monetary policy should respond to house
price growth or conduct a fully fledged Ramsey optimal monetary policy exercise. Instead, our goal
is to examine how an augmented monetary policy would have affected households’ lifetime utility, as
defined in Equations (1) and (3), and social welfare, compared to a hypothetical maximum LTV ratio
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policy in the environment of our model economy. Interest rates are set according to the usual Taylor
rule represented by condition (20) when limiting the LTV ratio. Following Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego
(2015), we define social welfare as a weighted sum of the individual welfare for patient and impatient
households, with weights being equal to 1− βH and 1− βS , respectively.8
Given the estimated smoothed shocks and model parameters, we solve the framework at first order and
simulate the model variables, assuming a maximum LTV ratio policy or an augmented Taylor rule had
been implemented. We consider the maximum LTV ratio at 0.85 and alternative values of the Taylor
rule parameter ΨQ from 0.1 to 0.5. We report the percent changes in households’ lifetime utility and
social welfare, compared to their baseline values, in Table 5.
Other things being equal, with monetary policy responding to house price growth, both credit-constrained
and unconstrained households’ would have experienced a decrease in their lifetime utility, even though
the corresponding utility losses are very small. The more aggressive monetary policy responds to house
price growth, the larger the utility loss. A maximum LTV ratio policy, instead, would have increased the
lifetime utility of unconstrained and constrained households by 0.5% and 1.5%, respectively, and social
welfare by 1.23% over the sample period of 1975 to 2008.
Table 5: Counterfactual Welfare Comparison
%∆UH %∆US %∆U
Maximum LTV ratio at 0.85 0.4997 1.4999 1.2296
Aug. Taylor rule with ΨQ = 0.1 -0.0743 -0.0743 -0.0743
Aug. Taylor rule with ΨQ = 0.2 -0.1432 -0.1424 -0.1426
Aug. Taylor rule with ΨQ = 0.3 -0.2073 -0.2050 -0.2056
Aug. Taylor rule with ΨQ = 0.4 -0.2671 -0.2628 -0.2639
Aug. Taylor rule with ΨQ = 0.5 -0.3230 -0.3161 -0.3179
UH and US denote the lifetime utility of savers and borrowers, discounted back to the start of the sample
period. U stands for social welfare and equals (1− βH)UH + (1− βS)US .
Table 5 provides strong evidence that a maximum LTV ratio policy is preferable to an augmented Taylor
rule that responds to house price growth in terms of maintaining the lifetime utility of households and
social welfare. The intuition behind our results is quite straightforward. Having monetary policy respond
to house price growth dampens the fluctuations of house price. The central bank raises the interest rate,
which benefits the lenders and hurts the borrowers, when house prices are on the way up and lowers the
interest rate, which benefits the borrowers and hurts the lenders, on the way down. Unlike an augmented
Taylor rule, limiting the maximum LTV ratio only creates downward pressure on house and rental prices
8We exclude the consumption components of entrepreneurs and bankers from the welfare analysis due to following two
reasons. First, the banker’s and entrepreneur’s utility maximization problem is equivalent of maximizing profits (see for
example Iacoviello (2015)). Second, impatient and patient households are linked through their accumulation of rental and
owner-occupied housing which makes it interesting to study the effects of counterfactual policies such as a limit on the
LTV requirement.
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during a housing boom and reduces default risk, and therefore benefits both types of households.
6 Conclusion
This study has developed a DSGE model of the U.S. which accounts for three important features: rental
and owner-occupied housing, endogenous default, and a banking channel. Allowing for these important
components enables us to study in detail the effects of mortgage default on borrowing, rental and house
prices. Furthermore, the rich framework presented in this paper provides a suitable environment to
evaluate macroprudential policies. For this reason, we perform a counterfactual analysis by placing
an occasionally binding constraint on the LTV ratio. Our analysis clearly shows that the dangerous
expansion of the housing sector in the early 2000s could have been offset, if authorities had followed the
LTV ratio policy studied in this paper. Finally, comparing an augmented Taylor rule that responds to
house price growth with the maximum LTV policy, we find that the latter is preferable in terms of its
effects on social welfare.
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A Technical Appendix (not for publication)
























+KhH,t +Dt + qt
{
[HH,t − (1− δH)HH,t−1] + [Hr,t − (1− δHr)Hr,t−1]
}



























































H,t + qr,tΩrHr,t +DIVt+
+ (RhM,tz
h
KH,t + 1− δhKH,t)KhH,t−1 − CH,t −
KcH,t
AK,t
−KhH,t −Dt − qt
{
[HH,t − (1− δH)HH,t−1]+
+ [Hr,t − (1− δHr)Hr,t−1]
}



































The first order conditions are:




























































HH,t : qtuCH,t = uHH,t + (1− δH)βHEt(qt+1uCH,t+1) (A.10)






































KcH , KhH and D are the respective steady state expressions for capital and deposits. The depreciation






















2 + (1− ζ ′H)zhKH,t + (0.5 ζ ′H − 1)
]
. (A.18)
The curvature of the depreciation function is determined by ζ ′H =
ζH




























































CS,t + qr,tZt + qtHS,t + [1− Ft(ω̄t)]
RSz,tLS,t−1
πt









RSz,t is the state-contingent interest rate paid by non-defaulting borrowers in period t on loans LS,t−1
taken in period t − 1. The state-contingent interest rate, which satisfies the lenders’ participation con-
straint, is adjustable and is set after the realization of the shocks. The budget constraint above can be
rewritten as:
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CS,t + qr,tZt + qtHS,t +
RS,t−1LS,t−1
πt
















The threshold ω̄t is defined as:



































The first order conditions are:
CS,t : λ
∗






























HS,t : uHS,t + (1− δH)[1− µGt+1(ω̄t+1)]βSEt(uCS,t+1qt+1) = uCS,t
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+ (1− γ)(1− ρD)Lt (A.39)
and Lt = LS,t + LE,t
The optimality conditions are:



































































































IHt = HH,t − (1− δH)HH,t−1 + HS,t − (1− δH)[1−µGt(ω̄t)]HS,t−1 + Hr,t − (1− δHr)Hr,t−1 (A.49)
Entrepreneurs maximize their lifetime utility
∞∑
t=0













































LE,t ≤ ρELE,t−1 + (1− ρE)AME,tEt
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−W cH,tN cH,t −WhH,tNhH,t −W cS,tN cS,t −WhS,tNhS,t −KB,t − pℓ,t(ℓt − ℓt−1)−RcM,tzcKH,tKcH,t−1−




ρELE,t−1 + (1− ρE)AME,tEt
(
















The first order conditions are:
CE,t : λ
∗


















































(1− α)(1− σ) = N cH,tW cH,t
[






(1− α)σ = N cS,tW cS,t
[
1 + (1− ρE)λE,tAME,tmN
]
(A.60)
NhH,t : qt IHt (1− µh − µb − µl)(1− σ) = NhH,tWhH,t
[




NhS,t : qt IHt (1− µh − µb − µl)σ = NhS,tWhS,t
[
1 + (1− ρE)λE,tAME,tmN
]
(A.62)
KB,t : KBt = µbqtIHt (A.63)





























EzKE,t + 1− ζ
′
E) (A.67)




+ qtIHt −RK,tzKE,tKE,t−1 −RcM,tzcKH,tKcH,t−1 −RhM,tzhKH,tKhH,t−1 −W cH,tN cH,t−





























































The depreciation functions δcKE,t takes the following form:
δKE,t = δKE + bKE
[
0.5 ζ ′E(zKE,t)
2 + (1− ζ ′E)zKE,t + (0.5 ζ ′E − 1)
]
, (A.76)
where ζ ′E =
ζE
1−ζE and bKE =
1
βE
[1−λE(1−ρE)mK ]−(1−δKE) implies a unitary steady-state utilization
rate.
A.2 Steady State Derivations
In this section we derive the steady state of the economy. Due to the complexity of the model we only
show the key steps and results of this exercise. Before we can start to derive the central expressions, we
first have to compute the steady state equations for the respective interest rates and multipliers. Based














































The next step involves to derive the housing-consumption, price-rent and housing ratio. From the saver’s













From the borrower’s problem we can determine the ratio HrHS , which later helps us to pin down the

















































Similarly we can obtain the output ratios from the entrepreneurs side. We summarize below all important











= oo3 ⇒ qHH = oo3CH , (A.94)
qHS
CS





















= Y oo7, (A.98)

















(1− µh − µb − µℓ)(1− σ)





(1− µh − µb − µℓ)σ
1 + (1− ρE)λEmN
. (A.103)
The collateral constraints of the borrower and entrepreneur deliver:




LE = mKKE −mN (N cHW cH +NhHWhH +N cSW cSNhSWhS ). (A.105)
In addition to this, we can rewrite the housing market clearing condition:
qIH = δHHqHH + qHS
{
1− (1− δHS)[1− µG(ω̄)]
}
+ δHrqHr
= δHHoo3CH + oo4CS
{
1− (1− δHS)[1− µG(ω̄)]
}
+ δHroo5CS
= δHHoo3CH + CS
{





oo8 = X[1 + (1− ρE)λEmN ], (A.107)
oo9 = 1 + (1− ρE)λEmN . (A.108)
Since labor enters the utility function via a CES aggregator we have to work with consumption-output ra-
tios. This implies we have to rewrite the budget constraint of both household types and the entrepreneur,





1 + δHHoo3 − δHHoo3
[
(1− µh − µb − µℓ)(1− σ)
oo9
+ (RhM − δhKH)oo2 +mN (1−RH)γE






(1−RH)γS [Γ(ω̄)− µG(ω̄)](1− δHH)
oo4
RS
+ δHroo5 − oo5oo6Ωr −
{





(1− µh − µb − µℓ)(1− σ)
oo9
+ (RhM − δhKH)oo2 +mN (1−RH)γE





















The expressions between the curly brackets are simply constants and therefore we can write:






T2 = T3. (A.110)
In the same fashion we can write the borrower’s budget constraint as:
CS
[
1 + oo5oo6Ωr + oo4
{
1− (1− δHS)[1− µG(ω̄)]
}






oo4 − oo4(1− δHS)[1− µG(ω̄)] + δHroo5












⇒ CST4 = Y T5 + CHT6 ⇒
CS
Y




Similarly the entrepreneur’s budget constraint becomes:
CE + Y
{
















− (1− µh − µb − µℓ)
oo9
− µb +mN (RE − 1)











(1− µh − µb − µℓ)
oo9
− µb +mN (RE − 1)



































































T9 − T7. (A.120)










oo4 − oo4(1− δHS)[1− µG(ω̄)] + δHroo5
}
. (A.121)
In order to derive the steady state in levels from the ratios, we now have to work out Y . This means we
have to pin down N cH and N cS . Along the way we are also able to derive the steady state NhH and NhS .
Algebraic rearrangement of the four optimality conditions involving saver’s and borrower’s labor choice


































X(1− µh − µb − µℓ)
1− α
] 1
1 + κNH (A.124)


































X(1− µh − µb − µℓ)
1− α
] 1
1 + κNS . (A.127)

























Having the derived the level of output, we then can then move on to define the consumption, residential
investment and the different types of capital stocks:





































qr = qoo6. (A.138)
The individual housing stocks can be computed from the market clearing condition of the housing sector.
IH = δHHHH +
{
















































Based on these results it is straightforward to solve for the other steady states values.
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